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Corporate Counsel Connect collection

December/January 2012 Edition

Libor's long & winding road

by Rajat Soni, Assistant Vice President and Kulbir Kaur, Director
Pangea3, Litigation Solutions www.pangea3.com Pangea3, Litigation Solutions

When Paul McCartney sat at the piano of a Scottish farmhouse to pen the words to The Beatles' last number one single, "The Long and Winding Road," he was describing the twilight of the iconic group, which would soon part ways. When the song was released in June 1970, the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, or Libor, was a mere twinkle in the eye of hopeful City bankers. But today, Sir Paul's song could well describe the beleaguered state of the once heralded financial metric, which now faces an uncertain future.

In June, British banking giant Barclays PLC announced a blockbuster £290 million ($460 million) settlement with U.S. and U.K. 1. While the settlement value grabbed attention at the time, the manipulation of the Libor, resting at the heart of the matter, proved far more consequential. But as the Beatles continue to dominate iTunes 40 years later, Libor is a story that is likely to be with us for several years.

Origin

Libor is a set of 150 blended rates, quoted daily, based upon a hypothetical interest rate banks would charge one another to borrow funds on a given day, in a specific currency, for a fixed period of time.2 Libor serves as a "benchmark" or "reference" rate for tens of thousands of financial contracts including home loans, student debt, mortgages and municipal debt. On the derivatives market, counterparties to a contract use Libor to fix payment terms and to establish market values for trillions of dollars of complex derivative instruments.

Calculating Libor

The British Bankers Association (BBA), a financial industry trade group comprised of member banks, created and administers Libor.3 The BBA is a consortium of U.K. banks and not a government institution. It is independent of the Bank of England (BOE), Britain's central bank responsible for setting the nation's monetary policy. Libor is set in a mechanical fashion as described below:

  • The BBA selected 10 major world currencies and 15 time periods, ranging from overnight to one year, calculating 150 different Libor values each day
  • For each currency, the BBA selects a "panel" of anywhere from six to 18 banks, usually comprised of the institutions which trade most actively in that currency.4
  • At approximately 11:00 a.m. GMT each business day, the BBA asks each panel member to quote the interest rate that institution would charge other banks to borrow the relevant currency for 15 different durations (or maturities).
  • Each institution enters its rate "submissions" on a Thomson Reuters terminal located within the bank. Panel members are barred from exchanging submissions beforehand.
  • The Thomson Reuters team assembles each currency panel's Libor rates and using a "trimmed mean methodology" removes the highest and lowest 25% of submissions.

Problems with Libor

One peculiar feature of Libor is that it is an "estimated" lending rate, not a real interest rate charged to another bank. The theoretical quality of Libor concerned critics, who claim this feature meant Libor was at best an educated guess and at worst pure speculation, especially for longer maturities.5 In fact, a recent study questioned whether banks even bothered to adjust the rate at all to reflect market conditions during normal times.6

Two other concerns have risen to the forefront in light of recent investigations.

  • The first concern involves an internal conflict of interest at banks. In theory, the Libor desk at each bank is supposed to be free from influence from other trading desks based on BBA and internal bank policy. In reality, many of a bank's risky trades, especially in the past 10 years, swing from profit to loss based on a small movement in Libor. This dynamic encourages a bank's more aggressive traders to actively try to influence their Libor desk colleagues to move the rate up or down to benefit their own positions.
  • The second concern with the hypothetical nature of Libor involves external pressure. When Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, the financial system suffered the equivalent of a sudden heart attack. The constant flow of money, essential to smooth functioning of the global financial system, ceased almost overnight. Since then interbank lending has essentially ceased to function normally.

During the crisis, several rates, including the overnight or spot rate, were impossible to calculate accurately because there was no credible overnight lending, an unprecedented event at the time. Each institution feared that others might collapse under the weight of undisclosed derivative liabilities. Banks across the world scrambled to assure the public, counterparties and bond markets that they were financially sound. Part of this process apparently involved some banks submitting "reassuringly low" Libor rates.

Libor's legal minefield

The Libor scandal has set in motion vast and complicated legal claims, given the centrality of the rate to global finance. Estimates of minimum damage run in the billions of dollars.7 Investigations are proceeding on several tracks.

Regulatory investigations

Civil and criminal regulatory investigations by prosecutors and/or market regulators in various countries as well as individual U.S. states continue today. The investigations became public over the summer.8 Recent reports indicate that additional subpoenas have been issued to a wider circle of banks from a joint probe by the New York and Connecticut attorneys-general.9 Yet, both U.S. and U.K. regulators are again pushing for another wave of settlements over the next 12 months after cooperation slowed this past summer.10

More troubling for the financial industry are the signs of impending criminal proceedings against specific individuals based on probes launched over the summer. Recently, prosecutors at the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) have indicated they may act against ex-traders at UBS, RBS and Barclays.11 This could threaten banks with potential enterprise liability if the claims reach high enough. The jockeying among regulators to bring charges before their foreign counterparts, and therefore hold sway over the direction of a prosecution provides an interesting twist to events as well.12

Congressional and parliamentary investigations

To add to the circus, even the regulators are being investigated. In October, media outlets reported that U.S. congressional staff began examining documents obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with respect to its monitoring of banks and key interest rates. A spokesman for the House Financial Services Committee confirmed the report: "These documents include internal New York Fed communications, communications between the New York Fed and U.S. regulatory agencies, and communications between the New York Fed and foreign government agencies in the United Kingdom."13 This is in addition to the parliamentary inquiries in the U.K. which have been going on for several months.

Private-party litigation

Litigation against banks is proceeding on several fronts and involves a stream of dozens of cases filed from 2011 until present.14 The cases, filed by a diverse group of plaintiffs including municipalities, brokerages, individuals, pension funds, and enterprises, include allegations of:

  • Fraud: Recently, a London court set the stage for the first damages trial to proceed against Barclays, brought by a home health care company in Wolverhampton, England that purchased swaps from the bank.15 The test case is being closely watched by thousands of other enterprises and potential litigants.
  • Breach of contract: Other potential litigants are contemplating lawsuits based on contracts which pegged interest on loans to Libor (e.g., student loans, home loans, mortgage-backed securities, municipal debt obligations). In these cases, bank counterparties may have breached contracts by underpaying interest to clients.
  • Antitrust: Another track of litigation involves numerous lawsuits filed under other federal and state statutes, specifically U.S. antitrust law,16 alleging collusion among banks to engage in price-fixing or a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws. Most antitrust suits are consolidated at this time, while others remain separate.17
  • Racketeering: Other cases center on the mob-era Racketeering-Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, which can implicate both civil and criminal conduct.18
  • Other theories: As recent commercial bribery cases have shown, U.S. prosecutors have been willing to creatively resurrect oft-forgotten laws like the Travel Act19 to apply to modern cases where the reach of certain statutes may be technically deficient.20

Triple damages could ratchet up liability. The criminal nature of the potential penalties means these claims could cripple senior bank management and ruin individual careers.

Conclusion

The legal problems facing banks promise to be enormous and long-lasting. Lawsuits could feasibly originate from almost every corner of the financial system given both the widespread use of Libor to set payment terms for commercial contracts and the use of Libor-based derivatives contracts by thousands of counterparties. Legal experts have referred to the Libor scandal as the financial industry's "tobacco" or "asbestos" litigation, recalling products liability cases which have involved decades of litigation, tens of thousands of lawsuits, and complicated claims processing and administration, spawning entire legal sub-specialties that persist today.


About the Author

Rajat Soni, Assistant Vice President, Litigation Solutions is a senior U.S. litigator who manages all aspects of document review intake, operation, and delivery, especially on complex document reviews. Reggie joined Pangea3 in 2010 after litigating at Davis Polk & Wardwell and at Fulbright & Jaworski. During his tenure at those firms, Reggie specialized in litigations involving antitrust, securities, market regulation, internal investigation and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act examinations. Reggie holds a J.D. from Northwestern University and a B.A. from Dartmouth College.

Kulbir Kaur, Director, Litigation Solutions supervises large teams of lawyers working on complex Pangea3 document review projects and frequently communicates with international clients on project-related matters. She has managed document reviews for litigation related to products liability, financial companies' due diligence, and patent infringement cases. Kulbir received an LL.B. and a B.M.S. (Finance) from the University of Mumbai, a Diploma in Intellectual Property Law from K.C. Law College in Mumbai, and a Diploma in Business Administration from ICFAI University.


1 Alexandra Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays paying $453 million to settle LIBOR probe, REUTERS, Jun. 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-barclays-libor-idUSBRE85Q0J720120627
2 British Bankers Ass'n, "The Basics of Libor", available at http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics
5 The Fog of LIBOR, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 14, 2012, stating, "A deeper problem still besets these numbers: they are almost entirely fanciful even if the banks that submit them are providing honest estimates."
6 Jean Eaglesham, et.al. Libor Furor: Key Rate Gets New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2012, at C1.
7 Brooke Masters, Banks' Libor costs may hit $22bn, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jul. 12, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0231ace4-cc1d-11e1-839a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22kmSajam
8 Shahien Nasiripour, Effect of Libor on U.S. loans examined, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jul. 11, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b2d25aa-cb66-11e1-911e-00144feabdc0.html, stating " 'I think the U.S. government should be just as aggressive in getting to the bottom of this scandal as the United Kingdom has been,' said Senator Sherrod Brown, chair of the bank regulatory subcommittee on the Senate banking committee."
9 Reed Albergott & Jean Eaglesham, Nine More Banks Subpoenaed Over Libor, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2012, at C3.
10 Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Banks pushed for next Libor settlement, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa28764c-1f85-11e2-b273-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2C4uxWEQ6
11 Lindsay Fortado, RBS, UBS Traders Said to Face Arrest in Libor Probe, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-09/rbs-ubs-traders-said-to-face-arrest-in-libor-probe.html
12 Id. "Green said the agency, while working closely with the DOJ, is also competing to bring charges first in order to handle the prosecution of any British citizens in the U.K., reducing the chance of extradition."
13 Damian Paletta, Panel Examines Libor Documents, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2012, at C3.
14 Blood in the water: The onslaught of cases tied to LIBOR gains force, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2012, stating that the 28 suits filed (at that time) "are either assigned or likely to be assigned to Naomi Buchwald, a judge in the Southern District of New York. Most are structured as a class action, meaning that the ones that gain legal traction will automatically include institutions with similar issues, an approach that dramatically increases the stakes. These cases cover individuals and pension schemes which held LIBOR-denominated bonds as well as financial firms that traded LIBOR products on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange."
15 Daniel Schaefer, First Libor Damages Trial to Proceed, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a0de5624-21fb-11e2-9ffd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2C4uxWEQ6
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.
17 In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation consolidated and pending in before Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, Master File No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y). Several Libor class-action cases are not yet consolidated into In re LIBOR, including Community Bank & Trust v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-4205 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2012); Berkshire Bank v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-5723 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2012); 33-35 Green Pond Road Associates, LLC v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-5822 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 2012); Lieberman v. Credit Suisse Group AG, No. 12-cv-6056 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 8, 2012); Courtyard at Amwell II, LLC v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-6693 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 4, 2012); Adams v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-7461 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 2012). This may change in the future.
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq., including Community Bank & Trust v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-4205 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 25, 2012), alleging federal and Wisconsin state racketeering claims.
19 18 U.S.C. §1952
20 D. Rodriguez & Michael Kniffin, Liability under the Travel Act for commercial bribery, WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY, Vol. 28., Iss. 08., Oct. 8, 2012.

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